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My purpose in this paper is to report the results of recent quantitative 
analyses of interest arbitration systems operating in the U.S. Arbitra 
tion systems for settling wage disputes ("interest arbitration") in the 
public sector have operated in some states since the 1960s. Although 
similar, in that they provide binding resolution of wage (and other 
employment-related) disputes, the various states have tended to experi 
ment by adopting somewhat different systems. This opens up the 
possibility of exploring and comparing how the various systems work, 
and that is the major purpose of the research on which I report below.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I first set out the broader 
context in which interest arbitration has become a feature of public sector 
wage determination in the U.S. The purpose of this discussion is to 
show how these dispute resolution institutions arose in a U.S. context 
which differs, as we shall see, from the Canadian and British settings. 
The following two sections of the paper describe analyses of arbitra 
tion systems for New Jersey police officers and for Iowa state and local 
employees. The purpose of these two sections of the paper is to present 
in a nontechnical manner the statistical operating characteristics of two 
functioning arbitration systems. I believe even a casual reader will be 
struck by the statistical regularities the operating characteristics of these 
systems display. I also believe that even a passing understanding of these 
operating characteristics will make it clearer just what we can and can 
not expect these arbitration systems to accomplish.
In a final section of the paper, I try to extract the general conclusions 
that are emerging from the new research on interest arbitration systems.
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Some of these conclusions are virtually conjectures at this point, while 
others have a considerable grounding in hard research results.
The Context of Interest Arbitration in the U.S.
I do not intend to survey the detailed evolution of interest arbitration 
systems in the U.S., as that has been ably accomplished by my col 
league Richard Lester in his recently published Labor Arbitration in 
State and Local Government. l My goal is instead to give the general 
context for the arbitration legislation that has been established, and to 
explain how it tends to operate.
The Right to Strike
For a variety of reasons local and state public sector workers in the 
U.S. do not have the right to strike (or even to bargain collectively) 
unless they are specifically given these rights by the state governments 
in the states in which they negotiate. This situation contrasts sharply 
with the rights of private sector workers in the U.S. and the rights of 
private and public sector workers in other countries. In Great Britain, 
for example, it is taken for granted that both private and public sectors 
workers will collectively bargain and, when a dispute is unresolved, 
strike their employers. Private sector workers in the U.S. face a varie 
ty of labor law regulations, but ultimately these workers may also 
organize and strike their employers. As in so many other matters of 
public policy, the Canadian situation seems to fall between the U.S. 
and British cases. Although private sector workers and many public 
sector workers have the right to strike in Canada, arbitration is sometimes 
legislated to replace the strike either on an ad hoc or systematic basis 
in some of the provinces.
Today the workers in the U.S. public sector do not have the right 
to strike. In many places public sector workers do not belong to unions 
or engage in collective bargaining either. In these places, workers who 
are not willing to accept employer-determined pay scales or working 
conditions are expected to quit and look for another position. In many 
places, however, public sector workers have been given the right to
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form unions and have formed unions that bargain collectively, although 
they do not have the option to strike. In this situation, one may natural 
ly ask, whey are public sector employers willing to submit disputes to 
arbitration at all?2
Although the varying politics of the various states no doubt plays a 
role, it seems likely that public employers have grudgingly acquiesced 
in the establishment of arbitration laws in some states largely to reduce 
the number of illegal strikes that would otherwise have occurred. In 
effect, the state legislators have often cooperated with public sector 
unions to design a statute that will settle disputes, rather than allow 
disputes to drag on indefinitely hi the face of employer resistance and 
the illegality of strikes. Subsequently, employer resistance has often 
diminished.
As a general rule, therefore, U.S. public sector trade unions obtain 
some leverage in colletive bargaining negotiations when the possibility 
of an arbitrated contract lurks in the background. This may be the reason 
why interest arbitration of public sector wage disputes is more accep 
table to union workers and their leaders in the U.S. than in other 
countries.
The Structure of Arbitration
The two most common forms of interest arbitration hi use in the U.S. 
are conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration. Each of these 
operates much like an informal judicial system. The parties are often 
represented by attorneys and they present their cases to a neutral ar 
bitrator. In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator may fashion any award 
deemed suitable, while in final-offer arbitration each party must pre 
sent an offer and the arbitrator must select one or the other without 
compromise.
The ' 'Chilling'' Effect. In the casual discussion of arbitration systems, 
it is often claimed that the final-offer arbitration system is more likely 
than the conventional arbitration system to lead the parties to present 
reasonable offers for the arbitrator's decision. This conclusion is usually 
based on a very specific idea of how arbitrators are likely to function 
in the conventional arbitration systems. The idea seems to be that
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arbitrators will, for the most part, attempt to fashion awards that fall 
precisely in the center of the employer and union offers. 3 If we assume 
parties know this will be the the arbitrator's behavior, they will surely 
wish to present extreme demands, for the more extreme a party's de 
mand, the more the party gains in the compromise. At the extreme, 
the parties will present no useful information to the arbitrator on what 
concessions they might be willing to make. This is sometimes known 
as the "chilling effect" of arbitration.
It is sometimes said that final-offer arbitration is not so likely to pro 
duce a chilling effect on bargaining because the parties would be unlikely 
to take an extreme position for fear that the arbitrator might select a 
more reasonable offer made by the other party. It is easy to see that 
this conclusion is also arrived at by assuming that arbitrators behave 
in a specific way. In particular, how are we to suppose an arbitrator 
determines that one offer is more reasonable than another? The natural 
equivalent to assuming that the arbitrator splits the difference in con 
ventional arbitration is to assume that the arbitrator flips a fair coin to 
choose a final offer. If this were the arbitrator's behavior, however, 
it is obvious that, instead of rewarding moderate behavior, the arbitrator 
would be rewarding the party making the more extreme demand with 
a 50 percent chance of success! Apparently, the alleged superiority of 
final-offer arbitration depends on the assumption that arbitrators will 
change their behavior when confronted by the final-offer arbitration 
procedure.
The Effect of Arbitral Uncertainty. Of course, this discussion of con 
ventional and final-offer arbitration depends entirely on the characteriza 
tion of arbitrators as simply "splitting the difference" in one way or 
another between the parties' offers in determining awards. Many ar 
bitrators, and some scholars, have begun to assert that this is not the 
way that arbitrators behave in any actual ongoing arbitration system. 
Instead, it is argued that arbitrators appear to behave in a similar way 
regardless of the type of systems under which they are asked to operate. 
In this view the arbitrator first arrives independently at some notion 
of a "reasonable" award based on the facts of the individual case. 
Although precisely how a reasonable award is fashioned is not com 
pletely specified, it seems very likely that, whatever the procedure,
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it will produce awards that differ from place to place and from arbitrator 
to arbitrator. It also seems likely that some of these differences in ar 
bitrators' preferred awards will remain unpredictable both to the par 
ties and to outside observers.
In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator then proceeds to fashion 
an award that may, to some extent, take into account both the positions 
of the parties and the arbitrator's own determination of a reasonable 
award. Under final-offer arbitration, on the other hand, an arbitrator 
will choose whichever final offer is the closer to the arbitrator's own 
determination of a reasonable award. Given the uncertainty associated 
with an arbitrated award, according to this analysis, we can expect a 
considerable incentive for the parties to negotiate their own settlement, 
regardless of whether the arbitration system is conventional or final- 
offer. There is, therefore, no "chilling effect" caused by the existence 
of either arbitration system. The chilling effect disappears so long as 
arbitrators introduce exogenous information into their decisions in a 
way that is to some extent unpredictable by the parties. It is this uncer 
tainty about their prospects that gives the parties an incentive to negotiate 
their own settlement in order to avoid the gamble an arbitrator's deci 
sion represents.
This discussion is a far cry from the simple analysis of the "chilling 
effect" of conventional arbitration with which I started. If it is a cor 
rect description of the way the arbitration process actually works, then 
it is clear that the simpler comparison of conventional and final-offer 
arbitration with which I started may be quite misleading. Moreover, 
the correct comparison between what may be expected under these two 
arbitration institutions will be considerably more complicated, and 
perhaps less conclusive. Which of these two analyses of the way ar 
bitrators behave are we to accept?
Ad Hoc versus Systematic Arbitration. In my view, both of these 
analyses have merit in the situations they were designed to describe. 
The confusion arises from failing to specify whether the analysis is to 
be applied to (a) an ongoing arbitration system where the parties will 
bargain repeatedly in the face of the same fixed, systemwide rules, or 
to (b) an ad hoc, one-time arbitration of a single dispute where the
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parties had no prior reason to suspect the dispute would be submitted 
to arbitration. It is, of course, very unlikely that situation (b) will oc 
cur more than once!
To see how the confusion may arise, consider a situation where the 
parties bargain with offer and counteroffer to a stalemate. Suppose that, 
contrary to the expectation of the parties, arbitration of the dispute is 
imposed by a third party, and that the arbitrator is made aware of the 
positions of the parties at the point of stalemate. Since the parties had 
no reason to suppose an arbitrator would be brought to the scene, there 
is no reason for the arbitrator to suppose that the positions of the par 
ties represent a mere bargaining posture. Instead, the arbitrator will 
assume that the parties' positions reflect reasonable concessions from 
both sides. Under these circumstances, it will be natural for the arbitrator 
to propose a settlement that "splits-the-difference" or lies midway bet 
ween the positions advanced by the parties at the point of stalemate. 4 
It is also clear, however, that this procedure will only work once. In 
future bargaining, the parties will expect the arbitrator to proceed the 
same way and "split-the-difference" in fashioning an award. This will, 
of course, give the parties the incentive to make extreme offers purely 
for the sake of impressing the arbitrator at the point of compromise. 
This is, of course, the "chilling effect" alleged to result from conven 
tional arbitration. Final-offer arbitration is a natural proposal to remedy 
this situation, but its effectiveness depends on the assumption that the 
arbitrator does not merely flip a fair coin to make a decision. Thus the 
advantage of final-offer arbitration is entirely a result of the assump 
tion that the arbitrator changes behavior under one system as opposed 
to another.
In practice, the arbitration systems used in the U.S. public sector are 
not of the ad hoc variety. They are, instead, fully specified systems 
within which the parties engage in repeated bargaining. It is natural 
in such systems to carry out private negotiations away from any poten 
tial arbitrator's presence so that offers and counteroffers will not be 
used by one party against the other during any subsequent arbitration 
hearing. (Indeed, it might be argued that arbitration statutes should be 
designed to further this purpose, so as to avoid any "chilling effect" 
of the statute.) 5 The result is that arbitrators are aware from the outset 
in these systems that the parties' offers, when presented in an arbitra-
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tion proceeding, are designed as bargaining positions. Since arbitrators 
cannot determine with certainty that the offers presented by the parties 
are realistic attempts at compromise, it follows that the arbitrator will 
necessarily be compelled to use external criteria, at least in part, in 
fashioning an award. This will be the case, of course, regardless of 
whether the arbitrator is operating under a conventional or final-offer 
arbitration system. Thus, a continuing arbitration system seems likely 
to implicitly require arbitrators to introduce external criteria in fashioning 
an arbitration award, regardless of whether there is a conventional or 
final-offer arbitration system.
Simulation Evidence on Arbitral Uncertainty. These are, or course, 
abstract arguments. As it turns out, there is considerable evidence emerg 
ing to support the view that arbitral uncertainty and arbitrator reference 
to external criteria are important aspects of the operating characteristics 
of U.S. arbitration systems. Moreover, arbitrators do not appear to 
change their decisionmaking when operating under different systems. 
There is also some evidence that the parties behave as if they unders 
tand this to be the case as well. Much of this evidence will emerge below, 
and here I only wish to give some indications of this evidence by showing 
its consistency with a recent questionnaire study of practicing arbitrators. 
This simulation study, by Henry Farber and Max Bazerman,6 reports 
the results of presenting 25 different economic scenarios to 64 actual 
arbitrators who then fashioned a wage increase award. Arbitrators were 
asked to fashion (or select) two awards, one on the assumption they 
were operating under a conventional arbitration system and the other 
as if they were operating under a final-offer arbitration system. Although 
there are important limitations to this approach, the results are quite 
revealing in that they are consistent with, but add considerable detail 
to, the data available from arbitration systems operating in the field.
A key finding is that when operating under a conventional arbitra 
tion system, arbitrators are far more heavily swayed by the facts of the 
case (as represented by wage rates of comparable workers, the infla 
tion rates and the financial health of the company) than by the last of 
fers presented by the parties. When the difference between the last of 
fers of the parties is small, Farber and Bazerman find that the facts
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receive about 75 percent of the weight in the arbitrator's decision, but 
that this fraction increases the further apart the last offers of the par 
ties. A simple interpretation of this result is that arbitrators view the 
parties' offers as typically carrying some information about where the 
parties might truly be willing to settle, but not much. As noted in the 
discussion of one-shot versus continuous arbitration systems, it seems 
likely that the weight placed on the parties' offers will be the greater, 
the greater the likelihood is that the arbitrator may consider the offers 
as having been made without the presumption they were merely a 
bargaining ploy. Unfortunately, the setup in Farber and Bazerman's 
study does not permit this hypothesis to be tested, and the design of 
such a test, while important, may be difficult.
Farber and Bazerman's results are obtained by experimentally vary 
ing the economic environments and the final offers that the arbitrators 
are instructed to consider. By comparing the arbitrators' awards when 
they face different offers in similar environments, Farber and Bazer- 
man can determine the extent to which differences in the offers arbitrators 
face influence their awards. Using similar methods, Farber and Bazer- 
man also can determine which parts of the economic environment in 
fluence arbitrator decisions. Here they find, as has been reported by 
others, that recent wage increases in "comparable settings" receive the 
largest weight in arbitrator decisions, although other factors are also 
important.
A second important conclusion of Farber and Bazerman's study is 
that the arbitrators, in their simulations, behaved as if they had selected 
essentially the same external criteria for an award regardless of whether 
they were operating under a conventional or final-offer arbitration 
system. In the case of conventional arbitration, the arbitrator simply 
imposed a reasonable award after due consideration of the facts and 
the parties' offers. In the case of final-offer arbitration, the arbitrator 
selected the parties' offer that was closest to the award the arbitrator 
would otherwise have imposed under conventional arbitration where 
the parties' offers were far apart. It follows that the arbitrators were 
behaving in a fashion that is consistent across institutional structures. 
Finally, Farber and Bazerman find that there is considerable 
variability in the awards that different arbitrators fashion in identical
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factual simulations. This suggests, but does not prove, that there may 
be considerable arbitral uncertainty facing the bargainers in interest ar 
bitration systems. If the bargainers are risk averse, such uncertainty 
should naturally produce an incentive for negotiated settlements. To 
determine whether such uncertainty exists, however, would require that 
two arbitrators be observed to fashion different awards in an actual ar 
bitration case, a situation that we will encounter shortly.
How Arbitrators are Selected and Paid
Unlike the U.K. and Canada, U.S. arbitrators' fees are generally borne 
by the parties. The fee schedule may be regulated by a state agency 
establishing a maximum fee, but its payment is generally split equally 
by the parties.
An important feature of U.S. arbitration systems is that the parties 
generally play an important role in selecting who shall be the arbitrator 
in a particular case. I have come to believe that this procedure has an 
important effect on the stability of the operating characteristics of in 
terest arbitration systems.
The selection of arbitrators usually proceeds in two stages. In the first 
stage, a third (governmental) organization produces a list of potential 
arbitrator names that is circulated to the parties. (In the private sector, 
this function is often served, for a fee, by the nonprofit American Ar 
bitration Association.) In the second step, the parties express their 
preferences for the arbitrators whose names are on the proposed list. 
Sometimes the proposed list of arbitrators is simply passed back and 
forth between the parties, with each party striking one name each time 
the list is passed, until one name remains. Alternatively, the parties may 
be asked to veto one or more names from the proposed list, and to rank 
order the remainder. Subject to an arbitrator's availability, the lowest 
sum of ranks then determines the arbitrator selected.
At first blush, it may seem surprising that the parties are asked to 
participate in the selection of the arbitrator. After all, if the parties are 
in a dispute which they cannot settle, it may seem odd that they are 
asked to select the arbitrator who will settle it for them. In fact, it is 
this aspect of the process that underscores the ultimately cooperative 
nature of arbitration systems.
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It seems clear that so long as the parties play so central a role in ar 
bitrator selection, it is likely that arbitrator behavior will contain an 
essentially unpredictable component. After all, if the arbitrator's posi 
tion is known, then it is likely that one or the other of the parties will 
have reason to strike the arbitrator from the proposed list. Apart from 
this unpredictable component, it is unclear what other factors are like 
ly to determine arbitrator popularity.
In a remarkable study, Bloom and Cavanagh have recently examin 
ed the determinants of arbitrator selection using the actual ranking by 
disputants of arbitrators selected in disputes involving police officers 
in New Jersey. 7 The evidence from their study indicates that both par 
ties view the characteristics of individual arbitrators in roughly the same 
way. This suggests that the parties may be acting in a moderately 
cooperative way in the selection of arbitrators.
Bloom and Cavanagh ask, and answer, two questions. First, do the 
parties tend to rank (and hence state their preferences for) the arbitrators 
on a given panel in a way that is positively or negatively correlated? 
They find that the parties' rankings are weakly positively correlated. 
This implies that there is such a thing as "arbitrator popularity." The 
question then remains, what determines arbitrator popularity? Bloom 
and Cavanagh find, first, that prior win-loss tallies under final-offer 
arbitration are uncorrelated with the parties preferences. This suggests 
that the parties are not "punishing" arbitrators for previous performance. 
Bloom and Cavanagh also find that the main determinant of arbitrator 
popularity is the amount of the arbitrator's prior experience. This sug 
gests that the arbitrator's "reputation" is a key determinant of the par 
ties' preferences.
Although it remains conjecture at this point, it seems likely that there 
is a connection between (a) the fact that the parties' preferences are 
a key determinant of arbitrator selection, and (b) the statistical regularity 
in the operating characteristics of the two arbitration systems describ 
ed below. In any event, the cooperative nature of arbitrator selection 
may well be an important factor in the acceptability of arbitrator awards 
by the parties. At a minimum, it seems clear that this method of ar 
bitrator selection is likely to enhance the feelings of the parties that they 
will receive a "fair shake" in any arbitration award. It is no doubt such
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"feelings" that determine the acceptability of the entire arbitration 
system.
Final-Offer Arbitration in New Jersey8
Unsettled disputes betweenNew Jersey police unions and municipalities 
have been subject to binding arbitration since 1977. The arbitration law 
is designed to give the parties considerable leeway in designing their 
own arbitration mechanisms. When the parties can agree on nothing 
else, however, their dispute is resolved by final-offer arbitration on the 
package of economic issues. As table 1 indicates, in 1978 about 35 per 
cent of bargaining cases in New Jersey were settled by recourse to final- 
offer arbitration, although this percentage has dropped each year since.
Table 1
The Results of Final-Offer Arbitration 
of New Jersey Police Disputes
Proportion of employer victories
Mean of employer compensation offers
Mean of union compensation offers
Mean of final-offer compensation
awards
Standard deviation of final offer awards























The only alternative arbitration mechanism of which the parties have 
made much use in New Jersey is conventional arbitration. As table 2 
indicates, in 1978 about 14 percent of bargaining cases in New Jersey 
were settled by recourse to conventional arbitration, although this per 
centage has subsequently stabilized at about 6 to 7 percent.
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It is natural for both employers and unions to inquire as to how they 
typically fare under a final-offer statute. The tabulation of "box scores" 
or "win-loss" records is inevitable. Even when these tabulations are 
not publicly available, it appears that they are the subject of considerable 
informed discussion and folklore.
The first row of table 1 contains the box score for the New Jersey 
experience. In 1978, arbitrators selected the union offer on total com 
pensation in 68 percent of final-offer arbitration cases. In 1979 and 1980 
arbitrators selected the union offer on total compensation in 65 and 73 
percent of final-offer cases, respectively. In sum, under the New Jersey 
statute, union offers have been selected most of the time in final-offer 
arbitration cases. There is no sign that this is a transitory phenomenon. 
This raises a question for the evaluation of this arbitration statute. Why 
have arbitrators most often selected the union offers in the New Jersey 
final-offer arbitration cases?
A Simple Model
Presumably, most of us expected to see approximately 50 percent 
of the union offers selected under final-offer arbitration. This is why 
the considerably higher percentages listed in table 1 seem surprising. 
To understand why this might not be a reasonable presumption, it is 
necessary to spell out what underlying model of arbitrator behavior and 
union and employer behavior we presumed would produce this 50-50 
result.
First, it seems reasonable to suppose that a fair arbitrator would be 
one who considered the objective considerations in a particular case 
and then settled on what, in the arbitrator's mind, seemed a preferred 
settlement. As I have observed, little is known about precisely how ar 
bitrators determine their preferred awards other than the consensus that 
they represent a sort of * 'going rate.'' Given that the arbitrator has deter 
mined a preferred award, however, it seems clear that a fair arbitrator 
must select whichever offer is closest to it.
We may suppose that the union and employer also understand this 
process. Using their best estimates of the arbitrator's preference they 
will then shape their own offers. They will understand that a higher 
offer by either party will increase the probability that the employer's
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offer will be selected. Similarly, a lower offer by either party may be 
assumed to increase the probability that the union's offer will be selected. 
As a result, most of us would expect that the union and employer of 
fers would tend to fall equally distant from, but on opposite sides of, 
the parties' best estimate of the arbitrator's preferred award. If this hap 
pens, then, we should naturally expect the union's offer to be selected, 
on average, in one-half of the cases.
It follows from this discussion that there are two different types of 
reasons why the union offer may not be selected in one-half of the cases. 
First, the arbitrators may not follow the decision process set out above. 
In particular, arbitrators may systematically give less weight to a 
generous employer offer than to a conservative union offer. If this is 
the case, then the integrity of the arbitration system is being seriously 
undermined. One may even wonder how long it is likely to last.
Second, it may be that, for one reason or another, the parties do not 
typically position themselves equally distant from, but on opposite sides 
of, the arbitrator's expected award. This could happen for one of two 
reasons. On the one hand, unions may have a more conservative view 
of what arbitrators will allow than do employers. On the other hand, 
unions may be more fearful of taking the risk of losing the arbitrator's 
decision than are employers. In either case we may expect that the union 
offers will be conservative relative to the award that arbitrators will 
typically prefer. Hence, the union offers will be disproportionately 
selected by the arbitrators.
It is important to inquire as to whether it is possible to distinguish 
empirically between these two alternative explanations for the dispropor 
tionate selection of union offers. If final-offer arbitration is operating 
alone, it should be obvious that there is no simple way to untangle which 
of these explanations is correct. After all, to determine whether the union 
offers are conservative relative to the employer offers we must be able 
to uncover the central tendency of the arbitrators' preferred awards for 
comparison. Since these preferred awards are unobservable when final- 
offer arbitration operates by itself, however, there would be no simple 
way to do this.
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Data Analysis
In New Jersey, the same pool of arbitrators is used in both final-offer 
arbitration and conventional arbitration cases simultaneously. If we may 
assume that arbitrators simply assign their preferred awards in the con 
ventional arbitration cases, then the numerical central tendency of these 
awards can serve as a benchmark for determining whether the union 
offers are conservative relative to the employer offers. A comparison 
of tables 1 and 2 reveals that this is indeed the case.
In 1980, for example, the mean employer offer was an annual wage 
increase of 5.7 percent, while the mean union offer was an annual wage 
increase of 8.5 percent. According to table 2, however, the mean con 
ventional arbitration award was 8.3 percent. Hence, if we may take 
the conventional arbitration awards as broadly indicative of arbitrators' 
preferred awards, it is clear that the union and employer offers were 
not centered at equal distances from, and on opposite sides of, the ar 
bitrators' preferred awards. Instead, the union offers were very con 
servative relative to the arbitrators' preferred awards. A comparison 
of the mean of the union and employer offers with the mean of the con 
ventional arbitration awards in 1978 and 1979 exhibits precisely the 
same phenomenon.
Table 2
The Results of Conventional Arbitration 
of New Jersey Police Disputes
1980 1979 1978
Mean of conventional compensation awards 8.26% 8.59% 6.55%
Predicted mean of conventional awards using 
data on final offer arbitration cases only and 
assuming "fair" arbitrators 8.27% 8.51% 7.41%
Standard deviation of conventional awards 2.10% 2.27% 2.21%
Predicted standard deviation of conventional 
awards using data on final offer arbitration 
cases only and assuming "fair" arbitrators 1.48% 2.54% 2.70%
Proportion of bargaining cases going to 
conventional arbitration .07 .06 .14
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It is possible to test statistically whether it is reasonable to suppose 
that the final-offer arbitration decisions in New Jersey were generated 
by a set of fair arbitrators who were systematically applying the con 
ventional arbitration standards. To do this, assume that arbitrators 
selected whichever offer was closest to their preferred award. Examining 
the final-offer arbitration data alone, it is then possible to estimate what 
central tendency (mean) and measure of variability (standard deviation) 
of arbitrator preferences is most likely to have generated the actual final- 
offer arbitration decisions observed.9 This part of our analysis could 
be constructed even if final-offer arbitration were the only arbitration 
mechanism operating.
It is then necessary to compare these estimates from the final-offer 
arbitration data against the actual central tendency and measure of 
variability for arbitrator preferences revealed by conventional arbitra 
tion data. This part of the analysis is only possible under a statute like 
New Jersey's. Lines 2, 3, 4 and 5 of table 2 contain the results with 
which to make the comparisons.
In 1980, for example, the actual mean of conventional arbitration 
awards was 8.26 percent, while the mean predicted as generating the 
final-offer arbitration awards if arbitrators were applying the conven 
tional arbitration standards was a remarkably close 8.27 percent. The 
comparisons for 1979 and 1978 are nearly as close, as can be seen from 
table 2. For 1980, the actual standard deviation of conventional arbitra 
tion awards was 2.1 percent, while the standard deviation predicted as 
generating the final-offer arbitration awards was a very similar 1.5 per 
cent. The comparisons for 1979 and 1978 are even closer.
In sum, the comparison of the pattern of the final-offer arbitration 
and conventional arbitration awards explains why the union offers were 
most often selected by arbitrators. The union offers were very conser 
vative relative to the pool of arbitrators' preferred awards. There is no 
evidence that arbitrators treat generous employer offers any different 
ly than they treat conservative union offers. Instead, the union offers 
are most often selected because the frequency of conservative union 
offers is considerably greater than the frequency of generous employer 
offers.
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This finding does not imply that the New Jersey arbitrators, taken 
as a group, may not be more (or less) generous than some outside 
observer of the arbitration process in New Jersey would approve. For 
example, the analysis implies that the central tendency of arbitrators' 
preferred awards in 1980 was around 8.3 percent, regardless of whether 
an arbitrator was working in the final-offer arbitration or conventional 
arbitration framework. Does this imply that the arbitrators were too 
generous in their general outlook?
The framework used here provides no answer to this question, and 
no doubt different answers would be given from different perspectives. 
The basic point, however, is that this issue cannot be settled by an ap 
peal to win-loss tallies under final-offer arbitration either. Only an 
analysis of actual awards and an appeal to some external criterion of 
fairness can answer the question of whether the arbitrators have behaved 
in a more (or less) generous fashion than is desirable.
Final-Offer Arbitration and Conventional Arbitration Compared
The conservative union behavior revealed in tables 1 and 2 results 
in a paradox. Unions actually received lower average wage increases 
under the final-offer arbitration provisions than under the conventional 
arbitration provisions of the New Jersey statute. For example, in 1980 
the mean of the actual final-offer arbitration awards was 8.1 percent, 
but the mean of the conventional arbitration awards was higher at 8.3 
percent. The union offers are accepted in a vast majority of the final- 
offer arbitration cases, but average union wage increases are lower under 
final-offer arbitration than under conventional arbitration. Although con 
servative union offers increase the likelihood of acceptance, this is not 
enough to offset the lower wage increase that is won. Appearances are 
indeed deceiving!
The result is that the union bargainers have taken a small loss in their 
mean wage increases under final-offer arbitration relative to what would 
have prevailed under conventional arbitration. It is also clear from a 
comparison of tables 1 and 2, however, that the union bargainers have 
gained something in return under final-offer arbitration.
In 1980, for example, the standard deviation of conventional arbitra 
tion awards was 2.1 percent, but the standard deviation of final-offer
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arbitration actual awards was only 1.4 percent, and the same discrepancy 
exists in 1979 and 1978. Thus, what the union bargainers gave up by 
way of a decrease in the mean award under final-offer arbitration they 
made up by a reduction in its variability. The union bargainers have 
bought "insurance" with their conservative offers, albeit at a cost in 
their wage settlements. This suggests that union bargainers may be more 
risk averse than employer bargainers in New Jersey.
Tri-Offer Arbitration in Iowa10
The data describing the operating characteristics of the New Jersey 
arbitration statute are an early indication that arbitration systems are 
especially amenable to convincing statistical analyses. Precisely why 
this should be the case is not yet known. Nevertheless, it is important 
to establish that this is a general characteristic of such systems by ex 
amining data from other operating systems to the extent this is possi 
ble. Some preliminary work has been done in the analysis of a quite 
remarkable statute for interest arbitration that has existed in Iowa since 
1976.
The structure of the Iowa statute provides the opportunity to examine 
three important questions about the way arbitration systems work. In 
the Iowa system, the parties have the option of negotiating a system 
of their own choosing, and in some cases this has led to the adoption 
of final-offer arbitration. Hence, it is possible to compare the results 
of the preceding analysis in New Jersey with some additional data from 
Iowa. Second, the system used in Iowa in most cases is designed (sure 
ly not intentionally) so that it is possible to observe two independent 
neutral arbitrators' observations on the same dispute. This provides an 
opportunity to assess the existence and extent of genuine arbitral uncer 
tainty that exists in the arbitration system. Finally, the Iowa system has 
operated long enough that it is possible to generate several years of time- 
series data for the purpose of assessing the way in which arbitration 
awards respond to changes in economic circumstances.
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Structure of the Tri-Offer Arbitration System
As noted, the Iowa statute allows the parties considerable leeway in 
the design of a system for settling a dispute. If the parties do not agree 
to an alternative procedure, however, they are compelled to resolve 
their dispute by a two-step, tri-offer system. Under this system, the par 
ties are first provided a fact-finder to propose the terms on which the 
dispute might be settled. After the parties have seen the fact-finder's 
proposal, they may negotiate their own settlement. If they do not agree 
on a settlement, the parties are compelled to submit their best offers 
to a second arbitrator. The second arbitrator must select the employer's 
offer, the union's offer, or, in a novel twist, the arbitrator may select 
the earlier fact-finder's proposal. Obviously, the extent to which the 
second arbitrator does not concur in the fact-finder's proposal is a 
measure of the degree of arbitral uncertainty that exists in the system.
Undoubtedly, the rationale of the two-step procedure is the recogni 
tion that disputes may arise because one or the other of the parties is 
poorly informed about the likely results of an arbitrated outcome. The 
fact-finder's proposal should serve to inform the parties of the likely 
outcomes. If this does not resolve the dispute, however, it is ultimately 
arbitrated.
The Fact-Finder Proposals
Over the period 1976-83, some 302 cases were submitted to the Iowa 
fact-finders. Of these, 181 (or 60 percent) were settled after the fact- 
finder's recommendation was submitted. This suggests that the infor 
mation produced for the parties by the fact-finders may be an impor 
tant ingredient bringing the parties to a settlement.
Table 3 contains the time-series of data on the average compensation 
increase proposed by the fact-finders in Iowa over the period 1976-83. 
There is one important conclusion suggested by these data: The typical 
fact-finder's proposal does move systematically over this period, rang 
ing from a high of 9.4 percent in 1980 to a low of 3.5 percent in 1983. 
A casual analysis suggests that fact-finder proposals move in a way quite 
similar to wage settlements in the rest of the economy, but perhaps with 
a lag. Further analysis of this issue is clearly required. The important 
point is that the fact-finders are not suggesting awards that are con-
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tinuously at extremes relative to those generated in other parts of the 
economy. It is natural to inquire, therefore, as to the relationship be 
tween these fact-finder proposals and the awards that appear under 
arbitration.
Table 3
Fact-Finders Recommendation (Percent Wage Increase) 











































SOURCE: Tabulations of arbitrator reports, State of Iowa.
a. The results for the years 1976-83 are from a regression that includes a dummy variable. For 
each year, the standard deviation reported is for the residuals from this regression and thus is 
the same for each year.
Final-Offer Arbitration
In some circumstances, the parties in Iowa negotiate an arrangement 
where, by mutual consent, the fact-finding step is eliminated from the 
arbitration statute. The system is effectively final-offer arbitration when 
this occurs.
Data on the mean union and employer offers in these cases is con 
tained in table 4. Also contained in the table are the win-loss records 
under final-offer arbitration in these cases. Having observed that the 
majority of arbitration decisions in New Jersey are for the union offer, 
it may come as some surprise that just the reverse is the case in Iowa. 
As the table indicates, over the period 1976-83, employer offers have 
been accepted in two-thirds of the final-offer arbitration cases. Does
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this mean that the arbitrators in Iowa had a pro-employer bias? Or was 
it the case that, in contrast to New Jersey, the employer offers were 
the more reasonable?
Table 4
Cases of Arbitration without Fact-Finding 
in Iowa (Percent Wage Increase)
Offers proposed by 
unions
Offers proposed by 
employer
Standard Percent Standard Percent Number 
Mean deviation wins Mean deviation wins of cases



























































SOURCE: Tabulations of arbitrator reports, State of Iowa.
a. The results for the years 1976-83 are from a regression that includes a dummy variable. For 
each year, the standard deviation reported is for the residuals from this regression and thus is 
the same for each year.
If we may assume that the fact-finders' proposals are a reasonable 
benchmark for arbitrator preferences, then this question may be analyzed 
in much the same way as it was analyzed in New Jersey. To see how 
this is done, consider the mean of the union and employer offers for 
1976. As indicated in table 4, the union offers averaged 10.6 percent 
and the employer offers averaged 5.7 percent. To see which of these 
was the more reasonable we may contrast them against the mean of 
the fact-finders' proposals in 1976, which was 6.2 percent. Using the 
fact-finders' proposals as a benchmark, therefore, the employer offers 
appear considerably more "reasonable" than the union offers. Consis 
tent with this comparison, table 4 indicates that the employer offers were
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accepted in all the 1976 cases. Although not so extreme, this same 
analysis is consistent with the data in each year until 1983. (The excep 
tion is 1978, but this involves only three cases.) Thus, in each of the 
years from 1976 through 1982, the mean of the employer offers was 
nearer the mean of the fact-finder proposals than was the mean of the 
union offers. During this period, the employer offers were accepted 
in 73 percent of the cases.
The exception is 1983, when the union and employer bargainers ap 
pear to have changed their offers so that the mean of the union offers 
was slightly closer to the mean of the fact-finder proposals than was 
the mean of the employer offers. Remarkably enough, in 1983 the union 
offers were accepted in 57 percent of the cases. Recall, too, that the 
fact-finder proposals used to benchmark these results are from entirely 
independent cases.
Like the data for New Jersey, these results for Iowa strongly con 
firm the hypothesis that the arbitrators, as a group, are behaving in a 
manner that is consistent across institutional structures. Thus, the reason 
why union offers are more commonly accepted by the arbitrators than 
are employer offers in New Jersey, and the reason why employer of 
fers are more commonly accepted by the arbitrators than are union of 
fers in Iowa, is not because the arbitrators in these two states are behaving 
differently. Instead, the win-loss awards under final-offer arbitration 
in New Jersey and Iowa are different because the union and employer 
bargainers are behaving differently in these two states. The union 
bargainers appear to put forward the more reasonable offers in New 
Jersey, while the employer bargainers appear to put forward the more 
reasonable offers in Iowa. Just why this should be the case is an impor 
tant question for further research.
Tri-Offer Arbitration
The data giving win-loss records for the cases ending in tri-offer ar 
bitration are contained in table 5. Surprisingly, in nearly one-half of 
these cases the union or the employer final offer coincides with the earlier 
fact-finder's recommendation. As the table indicates, it was slightly more 
often the case that the union's offer, rather than the employer's offer, 
coincided with the fact-finder's recommendations.
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TableS 
Tri-Offer Arbitration Results in Iowa
Employer's Fact-finder's
offer recommendation Union offer
Number Arrangement accepted accepted accepted 
of cases of offers (% of cases) (% of cases) (% of cases)
63 Three distinct offers 23.8 63.5 12.7
32 Union offer coincides with
fact-finder recommendation 34.4 65.6 65.6
26 Employer offer coincides with
fact-finder recommendation 61.5 61.5 38.4
The data in table 5 provide a very strong test of the hypothesis that 
arbitration decisions contain an element of behavior that is truly un 
predictable by the parties. After all, in each of the cases contained in 
table 5, two independent neutrals examined an identical factual situa 
tion. If the arbitrator does not select the fact-finder's recommendation, 
it appears that two qualified neutrals have disagreed on the appropriate 
award in the idential case. If this is a fairly common situation, it seems 
very unlikely that the parties will be able to predict arbitral outcomes 
with any precision.
The first row of table 5 indicates that where there were three distinct 
offers available for selection, the arbitrator and fact-finder agreed in 
about two-thirds of the cases. Remarkably enough, the second and third 
rows of table 5 indicate that, even when union or employer offers coin 
cide with the fact-finder's recommendation, the arbitrator still selects 
the fact-finder's position in only about two-thirds of the cases. In view 
of the possibility that arbitrators may be naturally inclined to defer to 
the fact-finder's proposal, this seems like strong evidence in support 
of the hypothesis that the parties face some true arbitral uncertainty.
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Conclusions
It should be apparent from this brief survey that a great deal has been 
learned from the interest arbitration systems operating in the U.S. in 
the public sector. For reasons that still remain unclear, simple statistical 
analyses continue to confirm a very stable set of operating characteristics 
for these systems. The data suggest that the arbitrators base decisions 
partly on the facts of the situation and partly on a unique assessment 
of what is an appropriate award in a given factual situation. The data 
also suggest that the determination of an appropriate award is largely 
independent of the type of arbitration system in which the arbitrator 
operates. As a result, the variability in the outcomes that exists across 
arbitration systems is a product either of constraints placed on arbitrator 
decisions by the institutional setup (for example, the selection of one 
of two offers under final-offer arbitration) or of differences in the 
behavior of the parties in response to different institutional setups. 
Precisely why arbitrator decisions may be characterized in this way is 
not yet known, but I suspect it is related to the importance of the role 
assigned to the parties own preferences in determining which arbitrator 
will have their case. In this sense private arbitration systems have a 
clear advantage of quasi-judicial or "legal" systems. Although the parties 
cannot agree on how to settle their dispute, they apparently do often 
share some common views regarding which neutral party should resolve 
it for them. It seems very likely that an arbitration system that exploits 
this fact will enhance its own acceptability.
In my view, the purpose of arbitration systems is to produce the set 
tlement of disputes in a way that is less costly than the alternatives. 
Whether interest arbitration will grow in popularity depends on whether 
it is a less costly system than the alternatives and on whether the par 
ties are able to obtain the information and experience necessary for deter 
mining whether it is less costly. This suggests that any experimenta 
tion with arbitration systems should be studied with care so that its costs 
and benefits can be examined and compared against the alternatives. 
If successful, the rewards to such study may be of considerable prac 
tical importance in reducing the overall cost of disputes in our society.
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NOTES
1. See Richard A. Lester, Labor Arbitration in State and Local Government, Industrial 
Relations Section, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, a book to which 
much of what follows is deeply indebted. For a survey of Canadian systems see Morley 
Gunderson, Economic Aspects of Interest Arbitration, Ontario Economic Council, Toron 
to, 1983.
2. This is an important issue, because interest arbitration is an option open to private 
sector disputants that is rarely used. Just as we may question why interest arbitration 
is so infrequently used in the private sector, so may we wonder why it is used in the 
public sector.
3. I have in mind here, and in what follows, the case where a dispute arises over 
compensation or some other quantitative issue. Obviously, where the issue involves 
a truly "yes or no decision," such as the granting of dues checkoff rights, final-offer 
arbitration is the conventional arbitration procedure.
4. In private correspondence J.E. Treble, of the University of Hull, has suggested 
that the situation I have just described bares some similarity to the state of affairs in 
late 19th century British coal mining.
5. It is sometimes observed that this is much the same as the principle in the civil 
law that proposals in settlement negotiations may not be used as evidence in a subse 
quent trial. This is presumably designed to encourage negotiated settlements of civil suits!
6. H.S. Farber and M.H. Bazerman, "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: 
An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, October 1984.
7. See David Bloom and Christopher Cavanagh, "An Analysis of the Selection of 
Arbitrators," Harvard University, June 1984.
8. The results in this section of the paper are a product of joint work with David 
Bloom of Harvard University. See Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "Models of 
Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, March 1984, 
and Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impar 
tiality by Win-Loss Tallies under Final-Offer Arbitration,'' Labor Law Journal, August 
1983.
9. Greater variability of arbitrator preferences will lead to a flatter slope of the rela 
tionship between the probability that an employer's offer is selected and the (average 
of) the union and employer final offers. Thus, the slope of this relationship in the final- 
offer arbitration cases is a measure of the (inverse of) the variability of arbitrator 
preferences. The method of estimation we use is called maximum likelihood, because 
it assigns values to the mean and standard deviation of arbitrator preferences that are 
most likely to have generated observed final-offer arbitration data under our assump 
tion about arbitrator behavior. The details of the method we use and some additional 
empirical material are contained in Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "Models of 
Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, March 1984.
10. The results in this section of the paper are a product of joint work with James 
Dow of Princeton University and Daniel Gallagher of the University of Pittsburgh.
